¡@ |
¡@
¡@Aside from theological issues, moral issues were among the most
discussed between Chinese scholars and missionaries in the seventeenth century. Both sides
expressed some interest in the moral system of the other. In Late Ming China the
intuitionist tendency of the Wang Yangming School stressed a subjective and autonomous
morality according to which the individual decides the question of what is good or bad.
Several Chinese scholars (associated with the Donglin school) reacted against this
tendency and were in search for a more objective and heteronymous morality. The Christian
teachings of the works of charity and the divinely proclaimed Ten Commandments became as
such a possible answer for the social disorder. Missionaries from their side appreciated
certain Chinese social teachings and institutions, because they could serve as the basis
on which to build the transcendental Christian teaching.
¡@With the arrival of Christianity, however, Chinese also faced new
dilemmas: missionaries opposed for instance concubinage or divination. But before treating
these practical issues, one first has to look into the ontological differences. Morality,
indeed, is based upon particular concepts like human nature and the world.
¡@Yet, the analysis of modern scholars treating the Christian and
Confucian concepts of morality leads to different conclusions. Analysis based on
anti-Christian or Confucian documents tend to focus on the differences. Writings of the
Chinese converts, on the contrary, underscore similarities.
¡@
Ontological differences
¡@As to moral issues, Jesuits and Chinese scholars did not agree with
each other due to their distinctive features in ontological concepts. The following
discussion is based on the arguments of Matteo Ricci (1552-1610) Nicolas Longobardo
(1565-1655) and Giulio Aleni (1582-1649), who have contributed most in this field,
although their approaches were not entirely the same, in comparison to Chinese thoughts.
¡@
1. Three Souls versus One Nature
¡@Matteo Ricci and his followers in their exposition of human nature
based themselves on scholastic theory, which originated in Aristotle's De anima (On
the Soul) and Parva naturalia (A Short Natural Treatises), especially his
Hylomorphism. Every natural thing in the world is seen as a combination of form and
matter. Soul is a living form, which enable thing to change from one status to another.
Aristotle discerned three different souls in hierarchical levels: the vegetative soul of
plants, the sensitive soul of animals, and the rational soul of human beings, which Ricci
translated as shenghun ¥Í»î, juehun ı»î and linghun ÆF»î.
Rational soul of human beings was seen as the highest one, which not only possessed the
ability of growing and moving but also is also capable of memorizing, reasoning and
willing. Rational soul was seen as an immortal substance, which transcended and controlled
the physical body, would be rewarded or punished after death, according to his behavior in
life. Through the rational soul, human beings were distinguished from animals and the
myriad things of the world and were able to bear moral responsibility.
¡@Ricci rendered anima rationalis as linghun, a term found in some
Chinese classical texts (like the Chuci ·¡Ãã) but scarcely used. As such, he
tried to give a new meaning to a classical term and to get rid of the mistaken, in his
opinion, traditional explanation of the term. Aleni, however, rendered rational soul also
with terms taken from the Cheng-Zhu school or Neo-Confucianism, such as lingxing
ÆF©Ê (intelligent nature), liangzhi ¨}ª¾ (innate knowledge), fangcun
¤è¤o (square inch, mind, heart) and weifa zhi zhong ¥¼µo¤§¤¤ (equilibrium
before the feelings are aroused). Aleni was of the opinion that such terms actually
conveyed the same idea as the Christian concept of the rational soul. Despite their use of
different terms, to both Ricci and Aleni the rational soul was originally good because it
had been created by the highest good, the Lord of Heaven. Longobardo intended to interpret
linghun as spiritual substance, rational soul, and daoti ¹DÅé as prime
matter, from which all physical things were created. Linghun and daoti were two different
He intended to server the unity of li (²z the Principle) and qi (®ð
material force) in the metaphysic of Confucianism in terms of these two different concepts
in Scholaristic philosophy.
¡@The Jesuits' redefinition of human nature in Neo-Confucianism by
means of rational soul, indeed, was pinpointed as a criticism to the theory of wanwu
yiti ¸Uª«¤@Åéƒn (all things are of the same substance), which regards all beings
as having been produced from the same substance, viz., material force. In Cheng-Zhu
school, everything in the world as seen as a combination of two inseparable elements,
i.e., li and qi. Everything in the world shared the same and the whole
Principle, which was absolute good, and thus everything was innately good by nature.
Through the Principle, everything was endowed with the virtues such as ren ( ¤¯
humanity), yi (¸q righteousness), li (§ propriety), zhi (´¼
wisdom) and xin («H faith). No matter the degree of clearness, all things received the
same principle, and thus shared the nature (xing, ©Ê). The difference between
human beings and other beings or things is merely a matter of difference in the endowment
of material force. While animals, for instance, have a turbid material force; human beings
receive material force in its highest excellence and clearness in which the goodness of
Principle can be fully completed if they follow the nature.
¡@The difference between the two systems of thought can be described
as a difference between three souls and one nature. The missionaries wanted to make a
clear distinction between human beings and other beings, because only the first possessed
an eternal soul, which continued to exist after death. It could be rewarded in heaven or
punished in hell for moral actions during life. This was essential for their moral system.
Therefore, missionaries refuted opinions that tended to obliterate these differences.
Confucian scholars, however, criticized missionaries and converts precisely for the
multiple distinctions they established and for taking human 'nature' (xing ©Ê) as
a separate and enduring entity coming from outside. Since compensation for moral actions
is to be expected in this world (for oneself or one's descendants), they stress how the
human person considers all things as one substance. The material force of plants, animals
and human beings disappears after death, but the one principle is found in all things.
¡@
2. "Overcoming Nature" versus "Following Nature"
¡@A major discussion in traditional Confucian thought was whether the
human nature was good or evil. Zhu Xi had settled the debate in favour of Mencius who was
of the opinion that human nature is good. Confucians adopted the Mencian opinion that in
moral conduct one should "follow one's nature" (shuaixing ²v©Ê). This
idea sharply contrasted with the Christian theory of original sin and obliged the
missionaries to reformulate their thought.
¡@Ricci was rather vague on the question, though he demonstrated that
human nature, considered as rational soul, is good. He advanced the traditional Christian
theory that human nature has "three moments": "integral" nature, as it
was before the Fall, "fallen" nature, the result of Adam's unhappy legacy, and
"redeemed" nature, as renewed by grace in Christ. This was further developed by
his successors like Aleni. Aleni advanced the opinion that "following one's
nature" could only be applied to the nature before it was spoiled. The present
nature, however, is fallen, and therefore one should speak of "overcoming one's
nature" (kexing §J©Ê) instead of "following one's nature". This is
the only way to reach the perfection of the Dao.
¡@Yet, this reformulation created new misunderstandings. Some Chinese
scholars, like Huang Zichen ¶Àµµ®f, pointed out that human nature is not something that
comes from outside and should be overcome. He argued that nature is innate. What should be
overcome is not human nature itself, but the habits and its contamination (xiran
²ß¬V) which surround and stain it. Moreover, nature is nothing but the principle and,
therefore, it is always good. How could it be evil? This was one of the major topics in
the discussions between Great Secretary Ye Xianggao ¸¦V°ª (1559-1627) and Aleni. After
being pressed, Aleni finally gave three reasons why there was also evil in the world:
original sin, the xueqi ( ¦å®ð blood and breath) of parents, and the customs of
the environment. This explanation confirmed the opinion that evil came from a human nature
which was originally good but later spoiled by original sin, and this was the reason why
everyone should overcome his nature. Another opponent to Christianity, Xu Dashou ³\¤j¨ü,
inquired into the same question. In the Chinese perspective, according to Zhu Xi, evil is
not something concrete as if it exists as a substance, but rather a way refering to a lack
of goodness. Whenever the activity deviates from the Mean ( ¤¤ zhong ), it is
called e (evil). All things are combinations of the Principle and material force.
Nature is good, but it is enclosed with material endowment as if a jewel silted in dirty
water. Therefore, everyone should transform his material force, just like cleaning the
silt enclosing a jewel, through education and cultivating the Way, i.e., following its
right way and finding the nature of oneself.
¡@
3. Salvation versus Forming a "Trinity between Heaven, Earth and the
Human"
¡@The morality taught by the Jesuits in late Ming China was based on
the theory of Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274): God, not man himself, is the sole source of
goodness, although man can only attain this by means of his free will and rational
decision. However, the original sin not only spoiled human nature but also severed the
relationship with the Lord of Heaven. Therefore, as no one could rely on his own nature
and reestablish the relationship, the Lord of Heaven himself offered a way to salvation in
three successive stages: xingjiao (©Ê±Ð enlightenment of the people with a
revelation to every individual nature), shujiao (®Ñ±Ð revelation of God's
teachings by the Ten Commandments), and enjiao (®¦±Ð personal revelation by
Incarnation in Jesus Christ).
¡@In line with the Christian doctrine, Ricci stressed the role of will
(motive or intention yi ·N) in moral action. "Good and evil, virtue and vice
all stem from right or corrupt motives." More importantly, the rational faculty
enables human beings to exercise control over desires. A person who is determined to
follow what is right and rational is in his moral conduct a superior man and will obtain
the protection and support of the Lord of Heaven. In the discussion on human nature, Ricci
distinguished between two kinds of goodness: acquired goodness or the goodness of virtue
acquired by human effort (xishan ²ßµ½), and innate goodness or the goodness of
human nature bestowed on the human being by the Lord of Heaven (liangshan ¨}µ½).
Confucianism, Ricci argued, fails to see that one cannot cultivate virtue by one's own
will and strength only, because the will tires easily. The Confucians are not aware that
they need the grace of the Lord of Heaven for protection and support; therefore, one
rarely sees a Confucian who has cultivated virtue to perfection. Ricci was not able,
however, to clearly explain how human goodness and virtue is the result of divine help on
the one hand, and of the merits accumulated by man himself on the other hand. Aleni,
rather straightforwardly, insisted on the importance of accumulating merits. Since
redemption had already been granted to human beings, one should take up one's
responsibility, i.e. accept the belief in incarnation, observe the Ten Commandments and
accumulate merits by way of Sacraments, good deeds, overcome the seven capital sins, and
practice the fourteen works of spiritual and material charity.
¡@Within a Confucian perspective, the relationship between Heaven and
all things could never be severed. Heaven and all things penetrate and respond to each
other because they share the same Principle (li). Everyone can cultivate the Way
and fully develop one's nature and "participate in the transformational activity of
Heaven and earth" (zantiandihuayu Ã٤Ѧa¤Æ¨|). As a result of this
participation, human beings form a trinity with Heaven and earth (yutiandican
»P¤Ñ¦a°Ñ). This is the basis of their morality, which they practise on their own
effort. It is realised in the present world and has nothing to do with a world after
death.
¡@One may conclude that in the Christian view, truth and perfection
only lie outside this world; man has to fight his own nature, his body and all its
temptations. The sole thing that matters is the salvation of his soul and this constitutes
the purpose of all morality. People have the free will to have their actions and behaviour
guided by reason and in this way to be rewarded with the salvation of their soul.
Confucian morality, however, is based upon the idea of an immanent moral order that is
present not only in cosmos and society, but also in the human being self. Thus, for each
person to act correctly means to integrate himself into the order of the world without
looking for a reward in a world to come.
¡@Though the differences are obvious (which made some modern scholars
conclude that a mutual understanding was rather difficult), some Chinese Christians like
Yang Tingyun underscored those differences do not disprove similarities between the two
systems.
¡@
Practical Parallels
¡@Despite distinctions on the ontological level of morality, there
were parallels between Christianity and Confucianism on the level of practical morality,
two of which similarities will be discussed below. Western practical morality was rather
well received in Late Ming. Moreover, the way in which missionaries expounded their moral
principles, corresponded well to the style as practiced in the academies (shuyuan
®Ñ°| ), which flourished in Late Ming and which were an important place for relationship
building among the Chinese gentry.
¡@
1. The relationship between tianli ¤Ñ²z (heavenly principle) and renyu
¤H±ý(physical desire)
¡@An important aspect of Confucian self-cultivation is
"conquering oneself" (keji §J¤v) to achieve harmony with the principle
of heavenly order (tianli). This principle is believed to be actively present in
nature, in society and even in human beings when they are able to silence their selfish
thoughts. To conquer oneself consists in rediscovering one's share in this heavenly
principle and developing it, while getting rid of the human and physical desires. This
idea was similar to the Christian morality, which insisted on following of the
commandments of the Lord of Heaven and subduing human desires.
¡@There was also similarity in the practice of conquering oneself.
During the 16th and the 17th centuries, there was a wide distribution of "ledgers of
merit and demerit" (gongguoge ¥\¹L®æ) in China. These were lists of virtues
and moral actions, which one was supposed to fill in after daily self-examination. The
earliest form of gongguoge was operated in a religious context. To each merit or
demerit corresponded some points, which in a rather mechanical way indicated the degree of
reward of punishment to be obtained. The practice of this system was closely related to a
belief in supernatural retribution of good and evil, which was not paralleled with the
orthodox Neo-Confucianism. This method, which was rather "fact-centered" and
otherworldly orientated, accommodated well among the popular. A new orientation of gongguoge
was later developed to encourage moral behaviour in a social, political and intellectual
context, which was practiced, by many scholars and officials alongside the
"ideal-centered" method of self-cultivation. It not only furthered moral
perfection through the mastery of scholarly learning but was also justified by the
orthodox Neo-Confucian teachings. It reflected the social and moral values which were
generally accepted within Chinese society, viz. the five relationships. This system of
self-examination, especially in its early form, was very similar to the Christian
tradition of self-examination of sins.
¡@This similarity resulted in Christian adaptations to the Chinese gongguoge
practice. Yang Tingyun, for instance, imitated the Western method of self-examination,
which consisted in keeping record of the sins one committed and was very similar to the gongguoge.
Not satisfied, however, with the mechanical aspect of the gongguoge, he insisted on
asking God's forgiveness and the practice of confession. For him, the exigency of moral
cultivation transcended cultural difference. Another Chinese convert, Li Jiugong
§õ¤E¥\ƒn(?-1681) was of the opinion that it was much better for one's spiritual
cultivation if one only records demerits. He himself wrote two books on
practical morality: Lixiu yijian Àyפ@Ų (A Mirror for Encouraging
Cultivation) and Shensi lu ·V«ä¿ý (Album of Cautious Thoughts). Both books are
arranged according to three relationships: self related to the Lord of Heaven (jingzhu
·q¥D or hetian ©M¤Ñ ), to others (airen ·R¤H or heren ©M¤Hƒn
) and to oneself (xiuji פv or heji ©M¤v). Li's purpose was to
harmonize the three relationships since they cannot be separated. To serve one's parents
or to clothe the naked, for instance, are the same as to obey the will of the Lord of
Heaven. Li's works show that his way of thinking had already become Christian. All moral
practice is for the sake of salvation, or in his own words: xihezhuyi (
µ¿¦X¥D·N fitting in with the will of the Lord of Heaven).
¡@Other works on ethics were Diego de Pantoja, (1571-1618) Qike
¤C§J (The Seven Victories over the Seven Capital Sins), which was quite popular among
the Chinese and Ricci's Ershiwuyan ¤G¤Q¤¨¥ (Twenty-Five Sayings), a partial
translation of Epictetus's Enchiridion, which was a Stoic morality manual in which the
things that depend upon ourselves and those that do not were set in opposition. They were
close to Chinese teaching that one should quietly accept fate and be content with one's
lot. Qike was a book of moral advice in which seven items were distinguished:
pride, envy, greed, anger, lust and sloth. These seven items were seen as deadly sins that
should be overcome so as to fulfill the will of the God. However, the practical meaning of
this book as a manual of self-examination was well accepted by the Chinese rather than its
theological meaning.
¡@
2. Relationship between the Self and the Other
¡@The other major point of similarity was the relationship between the
self and the other. Filial piety served as a cornerstone in the Chinese moral system. It
was the cardinal social virtue that gave stability and permanence to the Chinese family
and lineage system and, through this, to the whole of Chinese society. Filial piety even
received a cosmic dimension since Heaven was considered as father and Earth as mother.
Serving one's parents leads as such to serving Heaven. Filial piety is full developed in
the moral principle of the Three Bonds (sangang ¤Tºõ: between ruler and minister,
father and son, husband and wife) and the Five Constant Virtues (wuchang ¤±`:
righteousness on the part of the father, love on the part of the wife, brotherhood on the
part of elder brother, respect on the part of younger brother, and filial piety on the
part of son).
¡@The similarity of these values with Christian values appears from
descriptions of the West. For instance, Aleni explained in his Xifang dawen
¦è¤èµª°Ý that the basic principles on which the states and societies of the West are
based are identical with the Three Bonds and the Five Constant Relations of the Confucian
doctrine. Although the primary place is given to the Lord of Heaven in the first three of
the Ten Commandments, filial piety follows immediately (the fourth commandment). Jesuits
like Aleni and Vagnone also described the three major aspects of Western ethics in terms
directly borrowed from the canonical Daxue ¤j¾Ç: xiushen ר,
self-cultivation (ethica), qijia »ô®a, regulating the family (oeconomica), zhiguo
ªv°ê, ordering the state (politica) and pingtianxia ¥¤Ñ¤U, bringing peace to
the world.
¡@Chinese Christians also observed the similarities between the two
systems. The clearest example is Han Lin ÁúÀM (1600-1644). In his Duoshu ÅM®Ñ
(Book of Admonition), he attempted "to introduce Christian ideas into the official
system of Confucian indoctrination--a combination of the institution known as 'community
compact' (xiangyue ¶m¬ù) and the institutionalized explanation of the Holy Edict
(shengyu ¸t¿Ù) of the founder of the Ming". Han Lin's explanations of the
Six Maxims, found in the Holy Edict, "are based on both Confucian and Christian
arguments, not placed in juxtaposition (as an eclectic would do), but used to support each
other, as the true syncretist does." For example, he argued that the Lord of Heaven
is the great father and mother (da fumu ¤j¤÷¥À) of all men, mankind constitutes
one family, so all human beings should obey the will of the head of this great family, the
Lord of Heaven. Such Christian elements in Duoshu (but not the doctrine of incarnation,
passion and resurrection) are integrated into official Confucianism. The message of Duoshu
is that the doctrine of the Lord of Heaven is a useful instrument for the improvement of
society. In Han's eyes, one cannot preach the Way (dao ¹D) and the Christian
teaching outside human relationships (renlun ¤HÛ), because these relationships
are rooted in the nature of Heaven (tianxing ¤Ñ©Ê).
¡@Also in the eyes of some officials, Christian morality was an
excellent way to complement and to strengthen the rulers' transformation (wanghua
¤ý¤Æ). One example is Zuo Guangxian ¥ª¥ú¥ý (magistrate of Jianning «Ø¹ç) who
established a hall entitled Zunqin (´L¿Ë respecting one's parents) for the sake
of transforming and educating the people in the county. The other example is Lei Chong
¹pÓe, the magistrate of Jiangzhou µ¼¦{, who consciously used the ideas and practices
of Christianity to reinforce Confucian orthodoxy. Lei was influenced by the teaching of
Alfonso Vagnone. In an official proclamation by Lei, he used Vagnone's teaching as a
defense of Confucianism and a way to combat heresy.
¡@Religious associations of the West also met analogies in Chinese
culture. The trend of forming associations spread all over the state in late Ming China.
Most of them were established for academic reasons. Some were for the sake of accumulating
merits, such as fangshenghui ©ñ¥Í·|. Setting the captive animals free is a kind
of merit in the doctrine of Buddhism. After conversion, Yang Tingyun transformed it by
establishing renhui ¤¯·|ƒn. The major works of renhui were the fourteen
acts of charity «s¬á¤Q¥|ºÝƒn, which can be divided two sections: The acts for
physical cultivation §Î׃nand for spiritual cultivation ¯«×. The acts for physical
cultivation includes seven items: feeding the hunger, drinking the thirsty, clothing the
naked, caring for the sick, housing travelers, redeeming slaves and burying the dead. The
acts for spiritual cultivation also includes seven items: enlightening the ignorance,
encouraging people to do good by good deeds, comforting the sorrowful, correcting the
mistaken, forgiving the repentant, pardoning the weakness and praying for the live and the
dead. Indeed, Yang Tingyun had practiced this charity before his conversion. For him, the
difference was that setting the captive human persons free, both physical and spiritual
aspects, instead of animals became one way of accumulating merits.
¡@
Major dilemma
¡@Concubinage
¡@In Ming and Qing times, the practice of concubinage had become
more common among the general population than it had been in earlier times. The three
major reasons were the need for heirs, the fulfillment of sexual desire and the
manifestation of social status. The most explicit reason, however, was filial piety.
Indeed, not producing a male heir was considered the gravest among the major offenses
against filial piety (¤£§µ¦³¤T µL«á¬°¤j), the two others being not supporting
one's parents when they are alive, and not giving them a decent burial upon their death.
Therefore, if a man's spouse did not bare a son or his son died young, he could take
another woman to get a son. The Ming law even decreed that whoever tried to stop a man
over forty from taking a concubine when he had no son would be punished. As such
concubinage was a product of and strengthened the Confucian patrilinear family system. A
man without an heir would either adopt a son or take a concubine. There were three ways to
take a concubine: by marriage (naqu ¯Ç°ù ), by sale (qimai «´¶Rƒn) and
by promotion of a maid (shoufang ¦¬©Ðƒn). It would depend on different situations of
men.
¡@The arranged marriage system and the imperial bureaucracy also
encouraged concubinage. Instead of the marriage arranged by his parents, a man could take
a wife of his own choice, after becoming wealthy and independent of his parents. Moreover,
normally officials had to serve in a province different from his home. Their wives,
however, remained at home because they had to take responsibility in the rites of
filiality and worship. This separation encouraged men to take a concubine who could
accompany them to their place of office. A final reason for taking one or more concubines
was to celebrate the official position one had obtained and to show one's social status.
¡@The Jesuits prohibited the Chinese converts to have more than one
wife, on the basis of the sixth commandment that one should not commit adultery (funyin
§{ ²]). Ricci colored this commandment and stressed the abstention from lewdness,
lasciviousness, filthiness and the like, especially in regarding to the widespread
situation of homosexuality and concubinage in late Ming China. He intended to share some
insights of the goodness celibacy life to Chinese and to open their eyes to the wonderful
reward of chastity (zhen s ) in another world. Three levels of chastity were
distinguished. The lowest one is monogamous chastity (yifu yifu zhi zhen
¤@¤Ò¤@°ü¤§s), the middle one is the chastity of widower or widow (guangua zhi
zhen Å`¹è¤§s), the highest level is virginity (tongzhen µ£s). The less one
practiced sexual intercourse, the chaster one was. The three levels of chastity were
compared to the parable of the sower in the Bible: the one who received the seed that fell
on good soil will produce a crop, yielding a hundred, sixty or thirty times what was sown.
In other words, those who remain chaste all their life would yield one hundred times what
they had sown.
¡@Several Chinese Christians were confronted with the question of
concubinage. One typical example is recorded in Kuoduo richao. When Lin Youngyn
ªL¥ÎÆ~, a disciple of Aleni, passed as first in a yearly examination, his friends
encouraged him to take a concubine. As a good Christian and disciple, however, he rejected
the suggestion, which rejection Aleni highly praised.
¡@Yet, a practical problem arose when those who had already taken a
concubine requested baptism. There were several ways to solve this problem. The first
solution was that the convert was asked to separate from his concubine(s) forever, for
instance by putting the concubine(s) in another place and never have contact with her any
more. This was the solution adopted by converts like Yang Tingyun, Li Zhizao, Han Lin and
others. It was the most common solution. A second way was divorce, which meant to marry
the concubine to another man. For instance, Chen Zheng ³¯à², a disciple of Aleni, gave
his concubine in marriage to another man along with a large amount of money and clothes. A
third way was to marry the concubine (or one of the concubines) after the legitimate wife
died. Qu Rukui £¦¼Ä܃nand Wei Yijie ÃQ¸Ç¤¶ did so. A more disputable way was, when
the Jesuits allowed the convert to marry one of his concubines in case the legitimate wife
refused to become a Christian. To marry a concubine before the legitimate wife had died,
however, was forbidden by Ming law.
¡@There were also cases of transgression of the rule. Most famous is
the case of Wang Zheng ¤ý¼x (1571-1644). Initially, he rejected to take a concubine even
though he still had no son when he passed the jinshi examination (1622). Afterwards
he took a concubine and was excommunicated. Several years later, in 1637, he felt remorse
and promised to give his concubine a separate dwelling, as he wrote in his Qiqingjiezui
qigao ¬è½Ð¸Ñ¸o±Ò½Z„R (A Draft of Confession Request), in the hope that he could
be forgiven by the Lord of Heaven. As a result he was reintegrated in the Christian
community.
¡@The position adopted by the missionaries was criticised by
opponents. They advanced the argument that ancient sages like Emperor Shun had two spouses
and King Wen had more than nine. How could the missionaries be of the opinion that these
sages had been punished for this? They were greatly offended to hear that Jesuits placed
these sages in hell because they had committed adultery.
¡@The Jesuits made little compromise in the field of polygyny, though
some sources indicate that they also depended on the leniency of God in case of offense.
It was, however, one of the major obstacles for a Chinese man to convert to Christianity
since it was closely related to the question of ancestor worship. The Jesuits after
Ricci's death, e.g., Nicolas Trigault, were even intended to skip this problem in their
writings in order to maintain the help from Rome. When Christianity arrived in China, few
Chinese doubted the value and legitimization of concubinage; it was only in the nineteenth
century that it would be largely put into question.
¡@
¡@
Bibliography
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translation with introduction and notes by Douglas Lancashire and Peter Hu Kuo-chen, The
True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven, St. Louis: Institute of Jesuit Sources, 1985.
Aleni, Giulio, ¦ã¾§²¤, Xinxue cushu ©Ê¾Ç×Èz
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Teaching of the Lord of Heaven, 1798), Leuven: Central Library.
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(Collection of the Documents of the Catholic East Preaching), Taipei: Xueshengshuju
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